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Labor Supply
decisions o f  firms) and because questions involving 
labor supply are closely tied to im portan t issues o f  the 
public policy (such as the effect o f  income taxes on 
how  much individuals work). This research has been 
increasingly sophisticated in econom ic and statistical 
modeling. In addition, m uch m ore is know n today 
about work patterns than  was know n in 1960. Some 
com ponents o f the econom ist’s standard  m odel of 
labor supply (such as the intertem poral substitution 
elasticity) have been estim ated with confidence. H ow ­
ever, there remains some disagreem ent over the values 
o f o ther key param eters such as the effect across 
different individuals o f  increases in wages on hours 
worked. M ost econom ists probably believe that, for 
the typical worker, increases in wages generally induce 
relatively small increases in w ork hours although 
researchers would refrain from  confident statements 
about precise magnitudes.
See also: Economic G eography; Em ploym ent and 
Labor, Regulation of; Labor, Division of; Sex D if­
ferences in Pay; Spatial L abor M arkets; U nem ploy­
ment: Structural; W ork: A nthropological Aspects; 
W ork, Sociology of; W orkplace Environm ental 
Psychology
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Labor Unions
L abor unions are interest associations o f  w orkers in 
waged em ploym ent. They are form ed to im prove the 
m arket situation and the life chances o f their members, 
by representing them  in the labor m arket, a t the 
workplace, and in the polity, and in particular by 
collectively regulating their m em bers’ term s o f  em­
ployment. U nions emerged in the transition  to indus­
trial society in the nineteenth century, together with 
the de-feudalization o f  work, the rise o f free labor 
m arkets, and the com m odification o f  labor. While 
employing m odern m eans o f  form al organization, 
they represent an element o f trad itional collectivism in 
a m arket economy and society. U nions have taken a 
wide variety o f  form s and adopted different strategies 
in different historical periods, countries, and sectors. 
They are therefore favorite subjects o f com parative 
social science.
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1. Unions in the Social Sciences
The literature on unions is vast and extends into 
several disciplines. In the M arxist and socialist tra ­
dition, au thors in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries debated whether and how union­
ism m ight contribute to the overthrow of capitalism 
or, to the contrary, its stabilization. Democratic 
reform ers like Beatrice and Sidney W ebb explored the 
potential contribution o f  unionism to the governance 
o f a dem ocratic industrial society. Institutional econ­
omists, such as Commons and Perlman in the United 
States o r Brentano in Germany, tried to understand 
the economic causes and consequences o f unioniz­
ation. Neoclassical economists like Bôhm-Bawerk 
explored the capacity o f  unions to override m arket 
prices and achieve a  lasting redistribution o f  resources, 
while their successors in the 1960s applied theories o f 
m onopolistic com petition to analyze the impact o f 
collective bargaining on wages (Chamberlain). Early 
econom etric analyses studied the impact o f economic 
fluctuations on union organization and union ac­
tivities, including strikes (Ashenfelter). The discipline 
o f industrial relations, which grew after W orld W ar II 
in the US (Dunlop) and Britain (Flanders, Clegg), 
focused on unions as participants in collective bargain­
ing under the ‘New D eal’ and in the postw ar ‘mixed 
econom y.’ Sociologists took an early interest in the 
transform ation of unions into centralized and bu­
reaucratic mass organizations with a staff o f  full-time 
officials (Cassau). Postw ar American research on 
union democracy was in particular interested in 
the sources o f  communist influence in unions, while 
macro-sociological studies have investigated the ori­
gins o f  unionism  in the context o f social protest 
movements and their integration in the modern 
nation-state (Tilly). Political sociology and political 
science display a lasting interest in the role o f  unions in 
the polities o f industrialized democracies. Economists 
study the economic effects of unions, in particular with 
respect to relative factor prices, inflation, productivity, 
and em ployment (Freem an and Medoff, Calmfors and 
Drifill, Soskice). Similar concerns figured prominently 
in historical-institutionalist research and theory on 
neo-corporatism  in the political economy of advanced 
European welfare states (Schmitter, Crouch). Labor 
law has long been concerned with the rights o f unions 
vis-à-vis employers, and with reconciling collective 
bargaining and collective industrial agreements with 
civil law  and the freedom of trade and contract. 
Constitutional lawyers, in particular on the European 
continent, have tried to clarify the status o f unions and 
collective bargaining in relation to the state and public 
legislation.
2. The R ise o f  Unionism in Industrial Countries
U nions emerged in conflict with both economic 
liberalism and political authoritarianism , striving sim­
ultaneously for economic regulation and political 
freedom. As a  result, they were originally treated as 
conspiracies against free trade, the state, o r both. But 
as unions established themselves as effective labor 
m arket cartels, they also became suppliers o f labor to 
those employers willing to deal with them, and in this 
capacity slowly turned into ‘m anagers o f  industrial 
discontent’ (Flanders). Similarly, while unions repre­
sented the interests o f a class opposed to the advance 
of capitalism , their toleration in the course o f 
dem ocratization contributed to the transform ation  of 
liberal into organized capitalism , and was central to 
the institutionalization o f  com prom ise between capital 
and labor. The integration o f unionism  and working 
class collectivism in the institutional fram ew ork of 
m odem  industrial societies turned unions into legit­
imate interm ediary organizations between their mem­
bers on the one hand and employers and the state on 
the other, and transform ed class conflict into jo in t 
regulation o f w ork and employment. I t represents the 
foremost example o f  the stabilization o f  the capitalist 
economy through dem ocratic politics and institution 
building.
Early unions saw themselves as dem ocratic organiz­
ations o f  self-help and self-government o f  workers 
independent from the feudal o r bourgeois pre-demo- 
cratic state. Often they belonged to broader labor 
movements tha t included political parties, consum er 
cooperatives, m utual assistance funds, educational 
associations, sports clubs, etc. W hile unions generally 
resented interference o f  the state and the law in their 
internal organization and activities, they differed 
widely in structure and ideology. Thus, syndicalist and 
anarcho-syndicalist unions, which in a num ber o f 
countries rem ained significant well into the twentieth 
century, regarded themselves as constituent units o f  a 
direct democracy o f  producers set to  replace both 
capitalist employers and the bureaucratic apparatus o f 
the m odem  state. These traditions, which equally 
opposed capitalism and parliam entary dem ocracy and 
favored direct action over both collective bargaining 
and political-electoral lobbying, culm inated in the 
m ilitant council movements of W orld W ar I and the 
revolutions following it, especially in the Soviet Union.
Integration o f unions in dem ocratic capitalism , and 
union recognition by governments and employers, was 
greatly advanced by the two w orld wars. Economic 
m obilization and the governance o f  the w ar economy 
required the collaboration o f  union leaders, w ho in 
many countries came to be co-opted into positions o f 
quasi-public authority. Also, enlisted soldiers had  to 
be promised a better life in a fairer society upon their 
return from  the battlefields, and in defeated countries 
traditional elites were replaced in the afterm ath o f  war 
by liberal or socialist governments. Generally, the end 
of W orld W ar I brought political dem ocratization 
and, precipitated by the threat o f  socialist revolution, 
widespread acceptance o f  collective bargaining. But 
the first postwar settlement proved fragile in countries
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like G erm any, Japan, Italy, and Spain, where un io­
nism was soon suppressed by au thoritarian  regimes 
and replaced with state-controlled mass organizations 
o f  w orkers that were p u t in charge o f  adm inistering 
state social policy. Similarly, in the Soviet U nion 
w orkers councils were incorporated  in a repressive 
state m achinery and unions turned into ‘transm ission 
belts’ from  the state to the working class. In  the United 
States, by com parison, the New D eal extended union 
organizing rights while the Swedish Social-Dem ocratic 
governm ent o f the 1930s and the British war cabinet of 
the 1940s began to develop the contours o f the labor- 
inclusive Keynesian welfare state o f the second post­
w ar settlem ent after 1945.
The ‘golden age’ o f  capitalism  in the second h a lf o f 
the tw entieth century saw the worldwide ascendance 
o f a ‘m ature’ type o f  unionism , centralized a t the level 
o f the national state and pursuing econom ic and social 
policy goals through collective bargaining and 
political-electoral lobbying within the confines o f 
capitalism  and parliam entary  democracy. This de­
velopm ent was part o f  the consolidation o f  both  
dem ocratic capitalism  and the nation-state in the 
countries under Am erican hegemony, where legal 
recognition o f  unions and free collective bargaining, 
extensive social welfare provision, a  sizeable public 
sector, and politically guaranteed full em ploym ent 
m ade possible the coexistence o f liberal dem ocracy 
and the m arket economy. The norm alization of 
unionism  under postw ar ‘em bedded liberalism ’ 
(Ruggie) coincided w ith national regulation and 
standardization  o f the em ploym ent relationship and 
o f  the status o f  wage earners as distinguished from 
employers and the self-employed, which in turn  
corresponded to the advance o f industrial mass p ro ­
duction. Far-reaching legal and political regulation o f 
the labor m arket, introduced to insulate em ploym ent 
and em ploym ent conditions as m uch as possible from 
econom ic fluctuations, stabilized union power. The 
worldwide outburst o f  labor m ilitancy in the late 
1960s, which took  national union leaders by surprise, 
fu rther added to  union power, as governm ents, still 
feeling politically constrained to provide for full 
em ploym ent, m ore than  ever depended on union 
cooperation for restoring econom ic and political 
stability.
Econom ic, political, and social change in the 1980s 
and 1990s caused a  roll-back of unionism  in m ost 
countries. In  the 1980s, the British governm ent proved 
th a t elections could be won even with high levels of 
unem ploym ent. U nder the leadership o f  the post-New 
D eal U nited States, governm ents also found less 
politically and economically costly ways to com bat 
inflation than  ‘social con tracts’ with union leaders 
who had often turned ou t unable to deliver on their 
promises o f  wage m oderation. Low' inflation and high 
unem ploym ent coincided w ith deep industrial re­
structuring, in response to econom ic in ternationaliz­
ation and a new wave o f  technological change.
G radually  this underm ined the Fordist organization 
o f  work and the norm alized em ploym ent relationship 
unions had helped shape and with which they had 
learned to live com fortably. Also, the breakdown of 
Com m unism  in the late 1980s eliminated the systemic 
opposition to capitalism  th a t had made Western 
governm ents willing to m ake concessions to unions 
after the two w orld wars. While private sector union­
ism has alm ost disappeared in the world 's lead: 
economy, the U nited States, it is, however, still firr 
entrenched in m any European countries, due to strc 
institutional supports left over from  the social comp 
of the postw ar era.
3. Union Organization and Union Growth
The first unions were local protest movements of the 
‘working poor.’ In the m id-nineteenth century, they 
were superseded by form ally organized craft unions of 
skilled w orkers which thrived particularly in the liberal 
political environm ent o f  early industrializing Britain 
and America. Com m anding considerable m arket 
power, craft unions represented their members mainly 
through economic action. In addition to maintaining 
sizeable m utual assistance funds, m any of them were 
cartels th a t unilaterally fixed the price o f their mem­
bers’ services. F rom  the state craft unions did not 
expect much ap art from  freedom o f organization. 
While politically liberal, they were socially exclusive. 
N ot only was mem bership in them  reserved to the 
skilled. To control the labor supply, draft unions also 
limited apprenticeship training, prevented employers 
from  hiring non-union members for craft jobs (‘pre­
entry closed shop’ for specific ‘jo b  territories’), and 
defended an organization o f work th a t ensured de­
m and for their m em bers’ skills (job  control unionism).
W here craft unions became firmly established, they 
survived beyond the second wave of unionization at 
the end o f the century, when the growing masses of 
unskilled factory w orkers began to get organized. 
Given the weak m arket position o f their members, the 
‘general’ unions th a t undertook to organize the large 
factories o f the beginning age o f  mass production had 
to place their hope on the strength o f  large numbers. 
They therefore tried to recruit as m any members as 
possible regardless o f skill, although where craft 
unionism  was strong, they mostly rem ained unions of 
the unskilled. W hile craft unions preferred a ‘volun­
tarist’ mode of operation keeping the state a t arm ’s 
length, the new general unions emphasized political 
action and pressed for social legislation and state 
intervention in the economy.
In Anglo-America where industrialization and dem­
ocracy had come early, craft and general unions 
coexisted well into the tw entieth century, with the 
form er deeply influencing the practices and ideologies 
o f  the latter. By com parison, in late industrializing 
countries with au thoritarian  governm ents and nar­
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rowly limited political and economic opportunities for 
a m arket pursuit of collective interests, craft unions 
were m ostly absorbed in inclusive ‘industrial unions’ 
organized by economic sectors. As these had origi­
nated in often-bitter political struggles especially for 
universal suffrage, their unionism was embedded in 
universalistic concepts o f social and political reform 
that differed profoundly from craft particularism  or 
American ‘business unionism .’ Frequently the new 
unions were allied to political parties, especially 
socialist and Catholic, and while craft unions had been 
fragmented by skill, industrial unionism  was often 
fragmented by political orientation. Indeed as au th ­
oritarian governments had initially denied them the 
opportunity  to represent their members economically, 
some of the new unions remained for long subordinate 
to political parties.
C raft unions, while narrowly based and normally 
small, were highly centralized where their members 
faced national labor markets. W ith the rise o f the 
nation-state industrial unions, representing their mem­
bers through political action for organizational rights, 
favorable labor law', and social welfare legislation, 
also developed nationally centralized structures. In 
principle, these were usable for centralized collective 
bargaining as well, in solidaristic egalitarian pursuit o f 
nationally standardized wages and employment con­
ditions. However, getting members to support com­
mon dem ands in spite o f often widely different 
situations at their workplaces required strong organiz­
ations. While political ideology helped, the capacity o f 
national unions to aggregate the interests o f  a diverse 
membership depended in large part on whether em­
ployers were supportive o f negotiation at national 
level. In countries with an established craft legacy- 
bargaining remained mostly decentralized and frag­
mented as industrial unions had to allow their mem­
bers independent pursuit o f  sectional interests, on the 
model o f and in com petition with skilled unions. 
Sometimes, especially in the United States, unskilled 
unions m anaged to establish rights to ‘job  property’ 
for their members as well and enforced on employers 
their own version of a closed shop, under which new 
hires had to join the union within a short period or lose 
their job  (post-entry closed shop).
U nion organizational development in the nine­
teenth and twentieth centuries included the rise o f 
national federations o f local and sectoral unions, 
which occurred in close correspondence with the 
form ation of the modern nation-state and the es­
tablishm ent o f liberal democracy. It also involved 
growing independence of unions, not just from  govern­
m ents but also from friendly political parties, enabling 
even the industrial unions o f the European continent 
to deal with democratically elected governments of 
conservative political complexion. Related to this was 
increasing reliance o f unions on collective bargaining 
with employers as their m ain mode of operation, with 
either individual firms or employers associations. This
presupposed the elim ination o f  ‘yellow’ com pany 
unions controlled by employers as well as recognition 
o f  collective bargaining in labor law, for both  o f  which 
governm ent support was crucial. Collective bargain­
ing, in turn, required th a t unions established organiz­
ational au thority  over the strike— the collective 
withdrawal o f the labor pow er o f workers from 
employers—ju st as political recognition o f unions 
dem anded that strikes were called only for economic 
purposes, abandoning the syndicalist tradition  o f the 
‘general’ political strike. U nion organizational de­
velopment further involved integrating the growing 
num ber o f  w hite-collar workers, either in separate 
unions or inside encompassing industrial unions, 
which followed different trajectories in different coun­
tries and generally rem ained m uch less successful than 
the organization o f  blue-collar industrial workforces.
The literature offers a variety o f explanations for the 
growth and decline o f union membership over time 
and the differences in union density rates between 
sectors and countries. Unions tend to be strong in the 
core sectors o f  export-oriented m anufacturing, like 
metal engineering, in large establishm ents, and in the 
public sector, while they are weak in private services 
and in small firms. But cross-country differences are 
considerable, and  indeed on hardly any param eter o f 
social structure do developed industrial societies differ 
as much. W hile in some Scandinavian countries 
around 80 percent o f wage earners are union members, 
in France and the US density had fallen to about 10 
percent by the end o f the twentieth century. A nd while 
union membership relative to the workforce declined 
during the 1980s in the United Kingdom  and the 
N etherlands, it increased in Belgium and Finland. 
F luctuations in m em bership over time can also be 
enorm ous, as they were in B ritain where in the three 
years between 1920 and 1923, union density declined 
from  45 to 30 percent.
Econom etric studies have found tha t in the United 
States and Britain in particular, union density tended 
to increase with nom inal wages and inflation, while it 
was negatively affected by unem ploym ent and an 
already high level o f  unionization (Bain and Elsheikh). 
However, studies o f  this sort cannot explain the 
variation in unionization between countries, or rup­
tures in historical continuity. Institutionalist ap­
proaches take into account th a t union grow th includes 
the acquisition by unions o f recognized status, based 
on agreements with employers or the state helping 
unions recruit members (‘union security’). Often such 
status is gained in exchange for political and economic 
m oderation. Differences in union density then reflect 
different opportunities for unions to organize and 
keep members (‘w orkers don’t organize unions; unions 
organize workers'). In addition to the closed shop in 
its many official and unofficial versions— which makes 
membership com pulsory by making access to em­
ploym ent dependent on it— employers may assist 
unions in collecting their membership subscriptions.
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Similarly, favorable legislation on union recognition 
o r workplace representation through  works councils 
may im prove unions’ ability to recruit. In some 
countries, like Switzerland, non-m em bers are legally 
obliged to pay union dues, and in Belgium and 
D enm ark unions adm inister parts o f  the public social 
insurance system, enabling them  to discrim inate 
against non-m em bers and thereby create additional 
incentives to join.
M ore generally, the organizing problem s o f unions 
may be described in term s o f  generic problem s of 
collective action in the rational pursuit o f group 
interests. Union achievements, like higher wages or 
favorable social policy legislation, are often collective 
goods in th a t they canno t be withheld from  workers 
who have no t contributed to their production. A part 
from  sentim ents o f  fraternal solidarity, there is then 
little incentive for w orkers to  jo in  a  union, even if they 
find the outcom es o f  union activities desirable. Indeed, 
given the risk th a t others will ‘free-ride,’ m em bers may 
contribute in vain, as the union m ay no t find enough 
support to be successful. Like o ther collective organiz­
ations, unions therefore typically offer potential m em ­
bers ‘outside inducem ents’ (Olson), i.e., benefits o ther 
than  the collective goods for which they were originally 
founded, which unlike these can be lim ited to  members 
(for example, healthcare benefits). They also strive to 
m ake m em bership less voluntary and obligatory, often 
with the help o f the state o r the employers.
4. Unions as Collective A ctors
As interm ediary organizations, m odern  unions rep­
resent their members in the labor m arket, the w ork­
place, and the polity. D epending on their mem bership, 
their organizational structures and traditions, and the 
constraints and opportunities offered by employers 
and the state, different unions attach  different signifi­
cance to  the three arenas and coordinate  their activities 
in them  differently.
4.1 Unions in the Labor M arket
Unionism , and indeed m uch o f  m odern labor law, 
assumes tha t individual w orkers are a t a  disadvantage 
vis-a-vis employers, and th a t redress o f  this im balance 
requires tha t w orkers com bine to face their em ployer 
as a collectivity. By regularizing wages and conditions 
of em ploym ent, som etim es also th rough  state legis­
lation, unions try to take wages and conditions out o f 
com petition, to m ake the m arket m ore predictable and 
protect w orkers’ living conditions from  its fluctu­
ations. In this sense, Polanyi regards unionism  as an 
element o f the social counter-m ovem ent against the 
‘satanic mill’ o f  the ‘self-regulating m ark e t’ o f early 
liberalism.
Econom ists have long debated whether unions can 
raise wages above m arket level. Clearly, they can get 
nom inal wage increases that exceed the increase in 
productivity, which depending on the governm ent’s 
m onetary policy may result in either inflation or 
unem ploym ent. W ith respect to the wage structure, in 
fragm ented union systems skilled unions may use their 
independence to defend wage differentials, causing a 
wide wage spread between skill groups and industries. 
Fragm ented (‘com petitive’) bargaining may also en­
able well-organized groups o f  strategically placed 
unskilled workers to make high relative wage gains, 
which in turn  may result in a ‘leapfrogging’ pattern  of 
general, and potentially inflationary, wage increases. 
W age differentials are also high in economies in which 
unions have little o r no influence.
By com parison, industrial or general unions typi­
cally entertain an egalitarian ideology and strive to 
compress wage differentials, raising the wages o f their 
less well-paid members more than those o f  the others. 
The result tends to be increased capital intensity and 
unem ploym ent a t the lower end o f  the labor market. 
Industrial unions therefore favor extensive training 
and retraining, funded by employers o r the state, to 
increase the productivity o f the less skilled to a  level 
where they can earn the high wages negotiated for 
them. In favorable circumstances, this may lead to a 
general upgrading of a country or sector’s production 
system, in the direction o f  m ore skill intensive and less 
price competitive production.
Since the 1970s, there has been a debate on the 
relationship between centralization o f  collective bar­
gaining and various dimensions o f  macro-economic 
perform ance, such as inflation, grow th and employ­
ment. In the 1970s centralized bargaining by national 
or industrial unions was believed by many to be more 
economically beneficial than  fragmented bargaining, 
as it m ade it m ore difficult for bargainers to disregard 
the costs o f  redistributive bargaining or productivity- 
restraining work rules. Later it was suggested that 
bargaining agents in a decentralized wage setting 
system were m ore likely to be disciplined by m arket 
pressures, the problem  being interm ediate levels of 
centralization and unions both  large enough to 
override the m arket, and small enough to be able to 
externalize the costs o f their behavior to society. 
Statistical analyses have remained inconclusive and 
suggest that the economic effects o f bargaining struc­
tures are highly conditional on economic and insti­
tutional circumstances.
4.2 Unions in the Workplace
Com parative research suggests that employers are 
willing to agree to centralized bargaining if this helps 
them keep unions out o f the workplace. Workplace 
unionism , especially in a craft tradition, detracts from 
m anagerial prerogative and may interfere with m an­
agement attem pts to increase productivity. On the
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other hand, even industrial unions need to be present 
in the workplace, if only to recruit members, m onitor 
the im plem entation o f  collective agreements, and 
generally insert themselves in the governance o f the 
employment relationship and the ‘wage-eifort bargain’ 
inherent in the labor process. Balancing central and 
workplace representation, or external and internal 
union organization, was and is one o f the main 
problems o f unionism  and industrial relations.
Least o f all employers seem to like m ulti-unionism 
in the workplace. This has often led to agreem ent with 
industrial unions on unified arrangem ents for plant 
level workforce representation, like in Italy. In some 
countries, like the US, single-union representation is 
established by a legal procedure. In others workplace 
unionism is merged into institutions o f  legally based 
participation, giving works councils elected by the 
workforce as a whole rights to inform ation, con­
sultation, and co-decision m aking while ensuring that 
m anagem ent has a single counterpart with which to 
negotiate. W hile works councils in m ost countries 
cannot call strikes, they tend to have close relations 
with internal and external unions, not least since m ost 
of their members are usually also union members.
In  a num ber o f  Asian countries, unions have evolved 
into ‘enterprise unions’ th a t are only loosely federated 
above enterprise level. This corresponds to an en­
vironment o f  closed internal labor m arkets and life­
time em ployment o f  core workforces. Enterprise 
unions tend to be highly cooperative with managerial 
efforts to increase productivity and competitiveness as 
they represent the close community o f  fate between 
their members and the enterprise that employs them. 
Often their officials are m anagers whose career is 
advanced by serving for a time in a union position. 
W orks councils in E uropean countries also tend to 
cooperate with m anagem ent. Unlike enterprise 
unions, however, they exist next to an external union 
that can call strikes w ithout regard to the competitive 
position o f individual workplaces.
The economic effects o f  different form s o f  workplace 
unionism are still being debated. F or some time, 
decentralized unionism  and workplace bargaining 
were associated with high strike rates whereas central­
ized and politically influential unions, like those in 
Scandinavia, were found to be highly effective w ithout 
much recourse to strikes. Especially where distributive 
wage bargaining is moved to the national or industrial 
level, or where distributive conflict is suspended by 
jointly faced competitive m arket pressures, workplace 
representation was shown to enhance efficiency, 
among other things by enabling workers to voice 
complaints as an alternative to quitting. The same 
effect has been attributed  to works councils. By 
com parison, in countries with adversarial industrial 
relations traditions, external labor markets, decentral­
ized wage bargaining, freedom o f workplace unions to 
call strikes, and a history o f craft unionism  and 
restrictive practices, workplace unionism  came to be
regarded in the 1960s and 1970s as a source o f 
inefficiency. Here employers began to devise their own 
structures o f  workplace cooperation and ‘w orker 
involvement,’ in the context o f the developing practice 
o f ‘hum an resource m anagem ent,’ which often but not 
necessarily presupposes or aims a t a ‘union-free 
environm ent.’
4.3 Unions in the Polity
In m ost E uropean countries, the rise o f  unionism  was 
closely intertw ined with nation-building and state 
form ation. T. H . M arshal regards unionism  as a step 
in the evolution from  civil, to political, to  social rights 
o f citizenship, with unions using political rights to 
collective organization in the pursuit of social rights, 
albeit in the civil sphere o f  the m arketplace and 
through freely negotiated— collective— contracts (‘in­
dustrial citizenship’). As early repression o f unions 
gave way to inclusion in shared public spaces 
(Crouch), unions became firmly integrated in the social 
and political order o f  the W estern European nation­
state, especially under the second postw ar settlement 
after 1945.
The high point o f union inclusion in advanced 
industrial countries was the ‘neo-corporatist’ period o f 
the 1970s and early 1980s. Especially in countries with 
a tradition o f  political unionism  and centralized 
collective bargaining, unions were able to get m ajor 
concessions from  governm ents and employers in 
‘political exchange’ for wage restraint, which in turn 
was to enable governm ents to pro tect full employment 
with Keynesian means w ithout having to accept 
excessive rates o f  inflation (‘incomes policies’). Am ong 
the concessions gained by unions in this period were 
legislation on union recognition and access to the 
workplace; various o ther form s o f ‘union security’; 
legal extension o f  collective agreem ents to all firms in 
an industry; higher social security and public pension 
benefits; and industrial dem ocracy legislation. N eo­
corporatism  was m ore likely to work where govern­
m ents were o f a  social dem ocratic complexion; but 
most conservative governments were also eager not to 
antagonize the unions. The m ore politically powerful 
unions became under corporatist arrangem ents, the 
lower as a rule was the strike rate as strong unions 
were able to get in the political arena w hat others had 
to struggle for, with uncertain event, in the industrial 
arena.
The historically close involvement o f  union move­
ments with their respective nation-states explains to a 
large extent why unions and collective bargaining have 
so far resisted economic pressures for institutional 
convergence. In fact, the structure o f  unionism  and its 
status inside its institutional context are an im portant 
dimension distinguishing between the different ‘m od­
els o f capitalism ’ that have attracted  attention in the 
1990s. The lasting symbiosis between union move­
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ments and national states also accounts in large parts 
for the weakness o f international unionism. Such 
weakness is found even in the E uropean U nion, where 
in spite o f  deep econom ic integration national unions 
have rem ained highly distinctive in their organiz­
ational structures and modus operandi, and are jeal­
ously guarding their independence.
5. The Prospects o f  Unionism Today
M uch o f the literature on unions in the early 1960s 
observed and predicted a decline o f  unionism  in 
leading industrial societies. In m ost W estern countries, 
with the notable exception o f  the United States where 
union decline continued unabated, this was con tra­
dicted by the ‘ho t au tum ns’ o f 1968 and 1969, which 
were followed by a sharp reversal o f m em bership 
losses and by unprecedented influence o f  unions in 
politics. In the 1990s, however, union mem bership and 
pow er were again declining worldwide. W ith the 
Am erican private econom y on the way to effective de- 
unionization, the British governm ent in the 1980s 
attacked unions' legal and institutional supports, with 
considerable success. O utside the Anglo-American 
world, union influence was weakened by the end of 
politically guaranteed full em ploym ent com bined with 
intensified international com petition, while the grow­
ing im portance o f the service sector and the ‘know l­
edge econom y’ and the rise o f a  m ore diverse and 
better educated workforce m ade it m ore difficult for 
unions to  recruit new members. Even where insti­
tu tional conditions rem ained unchanged, unionism  
tended to be increasingly confined to the traditional 
sectors o f  the economy, which have long been shrink­
ing in size and im portance.
In their history unions have become deeply involved 
in the functional and social integration o f the m odern 
nation-state: in the national standardization o f  em­
ploym ent practices, the organization  o f  redistributive 
solidarity at national level, and the political govern­
ance o f  the national economy. The decay o f  the second 
postw ar settlement coincides with strong m arket 
pressures for m ore flexible modes o f  governance, less 
political interference, and internationalization o f econ­
omic transactions. It is no t clear w hether and how 
unions, and indeed the nation-state itself, will find a 
response to the de-nationalization o f the global econ­
omy. W ith their m em bership aging, unions may 
become defenders o f an industrial em ploym ent and 
social security regime th a t no longer fits the needs o f 
the rising post-industrial sector o f the workforce. 
Being unattractive to the winners o f structural change 
in the highly skilled and female segments o f the labor 
force, unions also seem less than  successful in organiz­
ing the new underclass o f low-paid service workers, 
m any o f  them  im m igrants, th a t has been growing for 
some time in m any industrial societies.
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Labor, Division of
Division o f  labor is a  feature of social structuring found 
in all hum an societies. Its form  varies widely and i 
changes over time. In a narrow  sense the concept is 
used in an economic context to describe the break­
down o f a complex task into a num ber o f  detailed 
and specialized tasks. In a social context the meaning 
is much wider, because labor and hence the con- j 
sequences o f  its division im pacts decisively societal 
structures. A n example fam iliar to everyone is the : 
household division o f  labor. This refers to the dif­
ferential allocation o f  tasks to women and men in the 
family and in childrearing. Following a definition of • 
labor, this article will consider the complexity o f this ! 
concept by focusing on different levels and dimensions : 
of the division o f  labor. Then its role in social j  
developm ent will be dealt with. The division o f labor j  
in m odern capitalist-industrial societies will be granted i 
the m ain attention. Finally, the developm ent o f social 1 
thought on the concept will be briefly examined.
■Hi
Labor, Division o f
1. Labor
L abor or work can be defined as purposeful activity 
necessary in any hum an society to secure its existence. 
Only hum ans do work in the sense of using creativity, 
conceptual and analytical thinking together with 
m anual aptitudes to transform  nature for their use (see 
Work and Labor: History o f  the Concept). A distinction 
between work and labor is often made. The word 
la b o r ’ is derived from  the Latin labor implying toil 
and distress, and hence labor alludes to arduous work, 
done under some duress and control by others. But the 
use o f  words is in fact not tha t strict. W ith regard to 
the specialization o f activities, it is common to speak 
of ‘division o f  labor’ (and not o f ‘division o f work'). 
Similarly, it is common for example to speak of the 
la b o r  process,’ the ‘labor m arket,’ the ‘labor move­
m ent’ (including the ‘labor unions' in the economic, 
the ‘labor party ' in the political sphere), or the 
‘International Labor O rganization' (ILO) and the 
expression ‘w ork’ is not used here.
2. Divisions o f  Labor
2.1 Concepts: Economic Division o f  Labor vs.
Social Division o f  Labor
All empirical evidence shows that labor or work 
always entails some specialization. Division o f  labor 
refers to separation of activities and the specialized 
allocation to different individuals. It is a universal trait 
of hum an existence. This does not, however, imply 
that it is caused by natural differences (biological 
differences between women and men, for example). 
Division o f  labor is always human-made, its forms are 
socially shaped.
A ny definition o f division o f labor basically m ust 
start with the recognition o f two different conno­
tations. In its narrow  and simple sense, the concept is 
used in an economic context. It describes the splitting 
up of a complex productive task into a num ber o f 
specialized, simpler tasks. The m ost renowned ex­
ample is that o f A dam  Smith (1776) for pin needle 
production. The increase in productivity is exactly the 
ultim ate reason for the separation and specialization 
of tasks in manufacturing.
This form  is known as detailed or technical division 
o f labor. I t m ade its appearance on the stage of hum an 
history w ith all-pervasive force only three hundred 
years ago in Europe with the establishment o f 
conditions no t in use previously: that is m anufacturing 
and the ‘invention’ o f capitalist principles o f p ro­
duction.
In a broad sense, division o f labor is a pre­
condition for conceptualizing society, as used in a 
social or sociological context. Reference to the social 
division o f  labor implies divisions at different levels of 
society which comprise its complex structure. Here the 
attention is on social differentiation such as class,
gender, or ethnicity; on the role o f power; on forces of 
social cohesion and disintegration; and on the im­
portance o f solidarity and morale. All the m ajor 
institutions o f  a m odern complex society play a  p a rt in 
the social division o f  labor: in the economic system  
with its elements like the m arket, com petition, capital, 
contract law, labor m arket, even differences between 
(paid) em ployment and non-paid labor; in the political 
system  with its various specialized institutions o f  the 
legislative, the executive, and the judiciary; in the 
cultural system  with its various socializing institutions 
for the creation o f skills, value orientations, and 
spiritual meaning.
In a schematic form the concepts may be listed this 
way:
economic division o f  labor social division
o f  labor
detailed division o f  labor division o f  labor
(e.g., technical division o f  labor) (e.g., by gender,
occupations)
2.2 Levels
It is clear from the above that division o f labor is a 
complex concept and can refer to  different levels of 
hum an activity. It extends from  the household or 
family on the micro level, through work organizations 
like enterprises on the meso (intermediate) level, 
divisions in society a t large on the macro level, to the 
entire world on the global level. Examples o f divisions 
o f labor on the various levels are the domestic division 
o f labor, the organizational division o f  labor, the 
occupational division o f labor, o r the international 
division o f  labor.
Here is an overview on the levels in schematic form:
Micro-level: e.g., domestic or familial division of 
labor
Meso- (intermediate) level', e.g., organizational divi­
sion of labor
Macro-level: e.g., occupational division o f labor
Global level: e.g., international division o f  labor
2.3 Dimensions
It is necessary to trace division o f labor in various 
different dimensions. The m ost obvious dim ension is a 
broad division o f labor between women and men, 
which all known societies exhibit in some m anner or 
other. This sexual (or gendered) division o f  labor is 
obviously im portant in the area o f  work, bu t it also 
reaches beyond tha t to social, political, cultural, and 
religious functions.
Any analysis o f the social structure o f a society, or a 
com parative study of different societies, m ust certainly 
consider the distinction between these varying 
dimensions. In addition, some dimensions are relevant 
at m ore than one level. The sexual division o f labor,
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